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INFORMATION MAY WANT TO BE FREE, 
BUT INFORMATION PRODUCTS DO NOT: 
PROTECTING AND FACILITATING TRANSACTIONS 
IN INFORMATION PRODUCTS 
Kristen Osenga* 
ABSTRACT 
Information products-products that are used to organize, provide 
context, and distribute information-have gone largely unprotected by 
intellectual property regimes. As a result, producers of information 
products, such as databases and software, have resorted to alternative 
mechanisms to protect their investments. These mechanisms have 
resulted in both over-protection and under-protection of the information 
products. Further, the uncertainty in the boundaries of coverage, 
coupled with the resort to self-help mechanisms, may well inhibit, 
rather than facilitate, information flow. What is needed is a sui generis 
protection scheme for information products that clearly defines the 
boundaries and protection requirements for these works and that 
provides an appropriate level of protection, based in part on a liability-
type regime, to both promote creation of information products and 
encourage transactions in these works. By protecting the investments of 
information product creators, while still allowing or even facilitating 
the free flow of information, it is possible to take a nuanced approach 
that capitalizes on the best of both intellectual property and alternative 
regimes. Information may want to be free, but information products do 
not. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Information is "the oxygen of the modem age."1 Despite its 
importance, or perhaps because of it, conventional wisdom has long 
been of the view that information wants to, or even needs to, be free. 
This idea has been extended to encompass not just raw data, but also 
information products such as databases and software. These products-
products whose primary value lies in organizing, providing context, and 
distributing information content2-have often been the subject of debate 
over whether and to what extent they should be protected. The tension 
between information being free and information products being 
protected is particularly acute in our technological society, where 
computers and the internet have made the collection, storage, 
management, delivery, reproduction, and transfer of enormous 
quantities of data as simple as clicking a mouse button or typing a 
keystroke) Even print compilations of information can be easily 
transformed into digital format using today's technology.4 
Yet while the combination of ever-improving technology and ever-
increasing access to and availability of information creates low barriers 
to entry into the information product market, it also facilitates 
misappropriation of these works. It is natural for creators of these 
goods to seek some form of protection to inhibit misappropriation and 
allow recoupment of investments made in the creation of these 
information products.5 For the most part though, traditional intellectual 
I Harold Jackson, Eyewitness: The Medium Is Massaged, GUARDIAN, June 14, 1989 
(quoting Ronald Reagan). In less dramatic fashion, information has also been called "one of the 
nation's most critical economic resources." Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data 
Protection, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at 
www .ssm.corn/abstract=' I 04678 I (quoting INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, 
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE AGENDA FOR ACTION 7 (1993)). See also JAMES 
BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY 2 (I 996). 
2 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Information Products: A Challenge to Intellectual Property 
Theory, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 897,897 (1988) (defining "information products" as "items 
like computer technology (including software programs and computerized databases), 'designer 
genes' and semiconductors: products whose information content vastly exceeds in value the cost 
of the products on which that information is stored" (footnote omitted)). 
3 See J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. 
L. REV. 51, 64-65 (I 997). 
4 See id. at 67. As true as this statement was in 1997, in the decade that has passed since 
Reichman and Samuelson published their article, the advances in technology have increased 
exponentially. 
5 See, e.g., SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS. ASS'N, SOFTWARE AND INFORMATION: DRIVING THE 
GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY I I (2008), available at http://www.siia.net/estore/globecon-
08.pdf. The Software & Information Industry Association (SIIA), the "principal trade association 
for the software and digital content industry," states that "[t]he U.S. software and information 
sectors depend on a meaningful international framework for the protection of [its] industry's 
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property law has failed to provide this protection. Copyright law 
specifically prohibits protection of ideas and facts; patent law, while not 
particularly excluding information products, has been generally, and 
increasingly, held by the courts to not extend to these works. To fill the 
void left by intellectual property law, producers of information products 
have resorted to other legal and non-legal mechanisms to prevent 
misappropriation of their works. These alternative constraints, 
however, shift the decisions of access and control to private parties who 
may not honor public welfare goals of intellectual property law, such as 
disclosure and fair use.6 As a result, instead of information qua 
information products being free, it is often effectively more propertized 
than it would have been under a traditional intellectual property scheme. 
Although protection for information products was debated long 
before these products were widely electronic, the issue has taken on 
renewed importance as information products become increasingly 
ubiquitous. The primary argument advanced by proponents in this 
debate is that protection is necessary to provide incentives to a creator 
to produce the protected work. 7 The exclusive rights provided by most 
protection schemes afford the creator an artificial lead-time to exploit 
his creation and potentially recoup costs sunk into developing the 
product. Proponents argue that information products, maybe more so 
than other works, require some grant of exclusivity to support optimal 
creation. This is necessary because the costs of developing an 
information product are typically front-loaded and the costs of 
appropriating, duplicating, and transmitting an existent information 
product are typically low. On the other hand, there are two main 
arguments advanced by those opposed to protection: first, information 
has to be free; and second, even in an environment of uncertain 
protection, information products are being produced. As to the first, 
most information is presumptively free for use so long as it is acquired 
fairly.s Information is often considered to be part of the public domain, 
intellectual property." See id. at 2, 39. 
6 See Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management 
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41,51 (2001). 
7 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997) ("Intellectual property is fundamentally about incentives to 
invent and create. While there are a number of noneconomic theories offered to explain both 
copyright and patent law, both the United States Constitution and judicial decisions seem to 
acknowledge the primacy of incentive theory in justifying intellectual property." (footnotes 
omitted)); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the 
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement 
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents 
of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."'). 
8 See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some 
Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 665 ( 1992). In 
fact, limitations on the use of information oftentimes must overcome the extraordinary protection 
provided by the First Amendment. See id. There are, of course, certain types of information that 
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free for anyone to access and use, and further considered to be "the 
building block of knowledge" and "a cardinal element in securing 
competition in a free market economy."9 As to the second, 
commentators opposed to protection for information products argue that 
it is speculative, at best, to presume that creators of these works require 
such incentive. IO 
Regardless of the merits of the debate, up to now, the decision has 
been seen as binary-either there should be protection or there should 
not be. This simplistic view, however, neglects an important facet of 
reality: the absence of protection does not guarantee that information 
will be free. In fact, evidence suggests that information products are 
routinely covered by other, more onerous, protection mechanisms that 
prohibit uses of information that traditional intellectual property 
protection would permit. 11 The fact that producers of these works are 
relying on alternative protection schemes removes much credibility 
from the second oppositional argument discussed above; that 
information products may be flourishing in the absence of intellectual 
property protection is not the same as flourishing in the absence of any 
protection. The incentive to produce these works is instead found in 
whatever other protective means the creators can wrangle to obtain at 
least the perception of exclusivity, but these alternate means lack the 
oversight and safety valves that can be implemented in an intellectual 
property scheme.12 
This scheme of incomplete protection under intellectual property 
laws and potential over-reaching protection under a patchwork quilt of 
alternate means leads to a system with unclearly defined coverage and 
rights. In tum, this further hampers the flow of information because the 
increased protection obtained by the creator comes at the expense of 
have not been granted unfettered freedom-blackmail, fraud, petjury, espionage, and the like. 
9 See Miriam Bitton, A New Outlook on the Economic Dimension of the Database Protection 
Debate, 47 IDEA 93, 100-01 (2006). 
10 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents on DNA Sequences: Molecules and Information, in THE 
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 417, 430 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
eds. 2002); see also, Bitton, supra note 9, at 119 (noting that those opposed to protection point to 
the great number of information products, and specifically databases, being produced between the 
1980s and today in the general absence of protection). However, this point may be overstated, 
particularly with respect to databases. Because many databases have been traditionally produced 
by single sources and the markets for these databases will not support multiple sources, it is 
unlikely the effects of market failure due to lack of protection will be seen. See id. at 121. 
II See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and 
Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 144 (2004). 
I2 See Justin Hughes, How Extra-Copyright Protection of Databases Can be Constitutional, 
28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 159,202 (2002) (noting that "it is possible that promulgation of a database 
protection law will actually retard the rise of legal and technological self-help" and that "the 
exceptions and exemptions from a database protection law could prove more important than the 
protection itself'). See generally Jacqueline Lipton, Balancing Private Rights and Public 
Policies: Reconceptualizing Property in Databases, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773 (2003). 
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increased transaction costs for disseminating the work13 and difficulties 
in negotiating access and use ofthe information products. 14 
What is needed is a different approach, one that appreciates the 
value added to raw information when it is included in an information 
product while preserving, and perhaps enhancing, the free flow of the 
information itself. This scheme needs to provide a well-defined system 
of rights in information products to both encourage creation of these 
works and facilitate transactions related to access and use of the 
products, and yet be flexible enough to ensure that innovation is not 
stifled because the necessary information has become propertized. The 
proposal outlined below considers information products that have both 
information components that typically remove these works from 
protection and structural components that add value to the information 
components by organizing the data, providing context to the data, and 
facilitating distribution of the data in a useful fashion. 15 The proposed 
scheme uses these components to clearly define the boundaries of the 
works and protection, as well as requirements for and appropriate levels 
of protection for these works. 
Part I discusses the current state of protection available for 
information products under the traditional intellectual property regimes 
of patent and copyright law. I conclude that neither of these systems 
sufficiently covers information products; indeed, these laws expressly 
exclude most of these works from protection. Part II describes 
alternative protection schemes that have been applied to information 
products in the absence of intellectual property protection, ranging from 
non-intellectual-property legal schemes to alternative non-legal 
mechanisms, as well as a number of legislative and academic proposals 
directed towards the protection of information products. I critique the 
inability of these means to provide adequate protection without over-
reaching. Part III explains the advantages of providing protection for 
information products and proposes a sui generis protection scheme that 
addresses the concerns previously discussed while still permitting a 
13 See Norman Siebrasse, A Property Rights Theory of the Limits of Copyright, 51 U. 
TORONTO L.J. I, 10-11 (200 I) ("Since creators have an incentive to use the most efficient form of 
protection available, and denying copyright protection reduces the available options, the licensing 
costs of the alternatives [such as contract or trade secret] will be equal to or higher than those 
associated with the copyright protection they replace."). 
14 See id. at 56-57 ("Objective uncertainty in the law implies a greater likelihood in large 
differences between subjective valuations of the [right the creator can assign] and a concomitant 
increase in the probability of bargaining breakdown."). 
15 It needs to be clear at the outset that the structural component of the information products 
covered by the proposed scheme is integral to the product itself. For example, an audio CD or a 
video DVD is arguably an information product, consisting of the information component (the 
audio or video itself) and the structural component (the media). However, the structural 
component is not integral to the information product, but is simply the delivery mechanism; 
contrast a database, where the field structures and other components themselves fundamentally 
add value to the information component. 
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creator of information products to reap some benefits for his investment 
in the works. The resulting scheme avoids over-reaching and allows for 
inclusion of safety valves and oversight. Further, by clarifying the 
boundaries of protection and implementing a liability-type regime, the 
scheme facilitates transactions in information products and may actually 
promote the free flow of information. 
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COVERAGE FOR INFORMATION PRODUCTS 
IS INSUFFICIENT 
Although the debate about whether information products should be 
protected remains, reviewing the current state of protection for these 
works demonstrates that a new scheme is required to avoid over-
protection and prevent the inhibition of information flow. Quite 
naturally, the first sources to examine for the protection for new, 
innovative, or creative works are the traditional intellectual property 
regimes-namely patent law and copyright law. 16 Neither of these 
regimes, however, provides adequate coverage for information products 
and, in fact, they actually exclude many of these works from protection 
in whole or in part. 
A. Patent Law 
A patent provides an inventor an exclusive right over his invention 
for a period of twenty years from the filing of an application for 
patent_I? For a patent to be granted, the patent application must describe 
a new, useful, and non-obvious invention in sufficient detail to permit a 
person of ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention based on that 
description. 18 Patents are granted on a wide range of inventions, and 
statutory subject matter for patenting includes processes, machines, 
16 Trademark law, although a traditional intellectual property regime, is not a viable source of 
protection for information products for at least two reasons. First, trademarks are an unusual type 
of intellectual property because the express purpose of a trademark is to convey information. See, 
e.g., Stacy L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait 
Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 467 (2005) ("Trademark law ... aims to promote more 
competitive markets by improving the quality of information in those markets."). Second, the 
information products contemplated by this Article are unlikely to qualify for trademark 
protection, as a trademark is defined as "any word, name, symbol, or device" that is used "to 
identify and distinguish" goods and "to indicate the source of the goods." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 
(2006). 
17 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006). 
18 The requirements for patentability of an invention are provided by 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 
I 03, and 112 (2006). 
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manufactures, and compositions of matter. 19 While these categories are 
generally broad enough to cover nearly every imaginable invention, 
there are three judicially-created exceptions to works that otherwise fall 
into these categories.20 Specifically, abstract ideas, laws of nature, and 
natural phenomena, the collection of which has been referred to as 
"fundamental principles," may not be patented.21 Although neither the 
statutory provisions nor the interpreting case law explicitly excludes 
information,22 information products have been barred from protection 
under patent law based on a number of theories. 
First, some information products, such as databases, do not fit 
comfortably within any of the enumerated statutory categories (process, 
machine, manufacture, or article of composition). While the machine 
and composition of matter categories are clearly inapplicable, the 
process and manufacture categories seem at least plausible for 
information products. However, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit has recently reinterpreted the statutory category "process" to 
require the method to be tied to a particular machine or to transform a 
particular article from one state or thing to another_23 This redefinition 
has two potential impacts on information products. The first impact is 
that the court specifically left open the issue of whether the recitation of 
a computer is sufficient to tie a computer-based method to a particular 
machine to satisfy the first prong, calling into question the patentability 
of software.24 The second impact is that the court reigned in what sort 
of data is eligible for transformation in the second prong. Here, the 
court grappled with the idea of transformation of non-physical objects, 
which may be implicated in information products.25 The inputs and 
outputs of information products are often electronic data or abstract 
concepts, which the court indicates may fail the transformation prong of 
the test for subject matter eligibility unless the data is representative of a 
physical object.26 With respect to the manufacture category, 
information products may encounter another hurdle. Case law has long 
excepted information products from patent protection under the "printed 
19 35 u.s.c. § 101. 
20 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
21 See id. 
22 See Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 419. 
23 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en bane). 
24 The Bilski opinion was specifically directed to a business method that did not require a 
computer, as opposed to software. However, numerous amici urged the court to consider 
software at the same time. The court declined to address the issue, but did indicate that simply 
reciting that the process be performed by a computer will not necessarily yield a statutorily 
protectable process. See id. at 962 (leaving to future cases to elaborate "whether or when 
recitation of a computer suffices" to tie a method to a particular machine). 
25 See id. at 962-63. 
26 See id. The court indicates that the transformation "must be central to the purpose of the 
claimed process" and that the transformation must be of a physical object or substance, or of an 
electronic signal representative of any physical object or substance. See id. at 962. 
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matter doctrine," which excludes printed articles from patent 
eligibility.27 The printed matter doctrine has been updated for today's 
technology to prohibit patenting of storage media including information 
(where the stored information represents the only new or inventive 
portion).28 
Second, even if the information product falls within one of the four 
statutory categories, it may fall within one of the judicially-created 
exceptions to patent eligible subject matter-abstract idea, law of 
nature, and natural phenomena. For example, in early case law, 
software was denied patent protection because courts considered the 
invention to be simply an abstract idea.29 At other times, because the 
software included an algorithm or equation that described the natural 
world, the work was held to be unpatentable because it fell within the 
law of nature exception.3° In the last few decades, it had been 
understood that software inventions were eligible for patenting, but 
recent administrative and legal decisions indicate that these works may 
again be considered to fall within the judicial exceptions of fundamental 
principles. 31 
Third, there is a policy argument against the patenting of 
information. Patents are granted on the basis of a bargain between the 
patentee and the public, granting the inventor a limited-time 
exclusionary right in a tangible application of an invention in exchange 
for free disclosure of information to the public about the invention.32 In 
the case of information products, because the work often does not 
provide any new disclosure to the public, the patent bargain is one-
27 See, e.g., In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910, 912 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (holding that a checkbook 
including both checking and savings stubs was not patentable because "the mere arrangement of 
printed matter on a sheet or sheets of paper does not constitute patentable subject matter"). 
28 See, e.g., In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Linn, J., dissenting in part) 
(noting that "if the only distinction between a prior art storage medium and a claimed storage 
medium is the information stored thereon ... then the claimed storage medium (with associated 
information) is" not patentable, either under 35 U.S.C. § 101 or 35 U.S.C. § 103 (citing In re 
Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1983))). 
29 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
30 See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
31 I have written elsewhere about the unfortunate revival of abstract idea rejections of 
software inventions. See Kristen Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1087 (2007). The recent Bilski case, discussed above, confirms my concern. 
There, the court reiterates the applicability of the fundamental principles exclusion from statutory 
subject matter, which is not troublesome, but seems to tie it to the machine-or-transformation test 
for a statutory process, which is troublesome. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960-61 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
("[W]e ... recognized that the Supreme Court has held that mental processes, like fundamental 
principles, are excluded by§ 101 because phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental 
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts ... are the basic tools of scientific and technological 
work. ... Because [the claims at issue] failed the machine-or-transformation test, we held that 
they were drawn solely to a fundamental principle ... and were thus not patent-eligible under § 
101." (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
32 See Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 425. 
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sided; the patentee gets the exclusionary right but the public does not 
get additional disclosure.33 Thus, at best, patent protection for 
information products is incomplete and uncertain; at worst, patent 
protection for information products simply does not exist and is 
considered inappropriate. 
B. Copyright Law 
Protection under copyright law grants exclusive rights to creators 
of original expressive works.34 The rights generally attach when the 
work is created and last for a period of the life of the author plus 
seventy years.35 Prior to the early 1990s, information products were 
presumed to be covered by copyright law; however, copyright 
protection is now generally unavailable for information products for 
many reasons.36 First, although the list of statutory categories of works 
for which copyright protection is available is fairly extensive and quite 
inclusive, bare information or data has been explicitly excluded from 
copyright protection under the idea/expression dichotomy, codified at 
§ 1 02(b) of the Copyright Act: "In no case does copyright protection for 
an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery .... "37 
Second, information on its own typically fails to qualify for 
protection under the originality doctrine, which states only original 
works of authorship are eligible for protection, where originality is 
found in a work that is independently created by its author and 
demonstrates a minimal level of creativity.38 The threshold of 
originality is quite low. Courts have largely defined the requirement in 
the negative, describing what will not suffice to obtain protection, but 
facts and data generally have been found deficient.39 
33 See Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 427. 
34 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 106 (2006). Copyright protection is available for a wide range of 
expressive creations, including literary works, musical works, dramatic works, choreographic 
works, graphic or sculptural works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, sound 
recordings, and architectural works. See§§ 102(a), 106. 
35 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). 
36 See Hughes, supra note 12, at 162 (noting that databases were perceived to have at least 
some protection in copyright prior to 1991, although the amount of coverage was ambiguous and 
varied by jurisdiction). 
37 17 u.s.c. § 102(b) (2006). 
38 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991) (noting that 
"[f]acts are never original"); see also id. at 347 ("[F]acts do not owe their origin to an act of 
authorship. The distinction is one between creation and discovery: The first person to find and 
report a particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence."). 
39 David E. Shipley, Thin But Not Anorexic: Copyright Protection for Compilations and 
Other Fact Works, 15 J. lNTELL. PROP. L. 91, 93 (2007). At least one commentator has argued 
that not all facts are created equal and that "created facts" may be sufficiently original to satisfY 
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Third, information products are often considered "compilations"40 
and are likely to fail the special originality requirement associated with 
that type of work. Although the compilation may include preexisting 
materials or data, the originality requirement is met only when the 
selection, coordination, or arrangement of the information meets the 
threshold of originality.41 Even if a particular information product 
meets this requirement, the protection is quite weak; for compilations of 
existing works, the underlying data "may be freely copied because 
copyright protects only the elements that owe their origin to the 
compiler-the selection, coordination, and arrangement of facts."42 
Further, computer-implemented databases often lack any sort of 
"arrangement" that the originality requirement seeks, because 
technology has made this arrangement irrelevant.43 
Both the idea/expression dichotomy and the originality 
requirement (generally and with respect to compilations) serve to 
facilitate a balance between encouraging creativity on one hand, and 
permitting access to information and ideas on the other.44 To reach this 
sense of balance, copyright law even grants partial property rights, 
extending protection to the "form in which an author has chosen to cast 
her thoughts or concepts and not to the thoughts or concepts 
themselves,"45 thereby leaving the information free from protection. 
The idea/expression dichotomy also ensures that copyright, generally, is 
completely consistent with the First Amendment's requirement that 
information be generally free.46 
A primary difficulty in applying the doctrines of idea/expression 
and originality, however, comes in determining how to categorize 
information products. Which portion of a work is unprotectable idea 
and which portion is protectable expression? What portion of a 
compilation represents originality of selection, coordination, or 
the originality requirement. See Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of 
Copyright Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 43, 59 (2007). 
40 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("A 'compilation' is a work formed by the collection and 
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a 
way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship."). 
41 See id. 
42 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 359. 
43 See Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of 
Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 345 (1992). Computer 
technology and the ability to store and retrieve seemingly infinite amounts of data have also 
skewed the "selection" requirement. 
44 See BOYLE, supra note I, at 56-57. 
45 See Zimmerman, supra note 8, at 666. 
46 See id. at 669 ("Efforts to control the use of information or ideas by others will generally 
be doomed from the outset if the claim is classified as an attempt to interfere with freedom of 
speech. If, however, a claimant can march the same basic dispute onto the field and successfully 
raise the standard of property rights, her likelihood of success will improve markedly."). 
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arrangement?47 For works other than information products, the line 
between idea and expression is often easier to draw, either because the 
nature of the work makes it simple to demarcate, such as a household 
ornament, or because we have clear rules as to how to distinguish, as in 
the case of a fiction novel.48 Information products, however, typically 
reside at some point at or near the division between idea and expression, 
or may even encompass both in a non-severable fashion. 49 
While copyright law may have initially, albeit superficially, 
seemed hospitable to protecting information products, courts have 
squarely addressed both the idea/expression dichotomy and the 
originality requirement for the two primary types of information 
products-databases and software-and have concluded that any 
protection under copyright is quite limited. The originality requirement 
as applied to compilations, such as databases, is set forth in the Supreme 
Court's Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 5° opinion; the 
dividing line between idea and expression in software works is explored 
by the Second Circuit in Computer Associates International v. Altai, 
Inc. 51 Because of the impact these cases have had on the potential 
protection available for information products, they will be discussed 
briefly below. 
In the Feist case, the Supreme Court clarified the level of 
originality required for a database to receive protection under copyright 
law. The databases at issue in Feist were published telephone 
directories. Rural had a monopoly franchise to provide telephone 
service to a number of communities and, pursuant to state law, was 
required to update and publish annually a standard white pages listing of 
its customers.52 Feist wished to publish area-wide telephone books, 
some portions overlapping with areas serviced by RuraJ.53 When Rural 
refused to license its listings, Feist simply took the necessary portions of 
the directories and incorporated them into its area directories. In a 
copyright infringement suit brought by Rural, both the district court and 
the Tenth Circuit found Rural's directories were protected by copyright 
law and held Feist liable for infringement.54 
Feist appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to 
resolve a circuit split about the viability of the sweat-of-the-brow 
doctrine-that is, whether copyright protection could be granted for 
industrious collection or whether protection was reserved for works of 
47 See id. at 668-69. 
48 See Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 903. 
49 See id. at 904. 
50 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
51 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
52 Feist, 499 U.S. at 342. 
53 !d. at 342-43. 
54 !d. at 344. 
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creative expression only.55 Based on its analysis of the history of the 
Copyright Act, the Court concluded that Congress, in the 1976 
Copyright Act, specifically overruled the sweat-of-the-brow doctrine by 
requiring originality for the protection of compilations. 56 On the facts 
of Feist, the Court determined Rural's directory was not protected under 
copyright because the selection of listings was obvious and the 
arrangement was "not only unoriginal, [but] practically inevitable" and 
"devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity."57 
From the Feist case, the following analysis constrains the extent of 
copyright protection available for databases: 1) facts are not 
independently eligible for copyright; 2) that facts are compiled by 
industrious collection or sweat of the brow does not alter the non-
copyrightable nature of the facts; and 3) collections of facts (and 
databases generally) become eligible for copyright protection only 
through a showing of creativity in the unique or original selection, 
coordination, or arrangement of the facts. 58 Court opinions subsequent 
to Feist demonstrate that this burden of originality often keeps factual 
compilations from copyright protection.59 Various, seemingly useful, 
databases, such as specialized yellow pages, catalog numbers for parts, 
data about collectibles or car values, and classifications and taxonomies, 
have all been denied protection.60 To avoid falling outside the scope of 
copyright protection, database owners have sought to qualify for 
copyright protection by injecting arbitrary creativity into the selection 
and arrangement of facts in their databases.61 Unfortunately, in doing 
so, the database creator is often decreasing the product's utility, which 
derives value from having a comprehensive (albeit obvious) selection of 
facts provided in an easy to use (but unoriginal) arrangement. 62 Thus, 
for many databases, an important category of information products, 
copyright protection is simply not available. 
The scope of protection for computer programs has similarly 
provided the courts with the opportunity to clarify the application of the 
idea/expression dichotomy. Much software appears to encompass 
expressive features (for example, in the visual portions or graphical user 
55 !d. at 345-46. 
56 !d. at 354-56; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defming a compilation as "a work formed 
by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, 
or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of 
authorship" (emphasis added)). 
57 Feist, 499 U.S. at 362-63. 
58 !d. at 358. 
59 See Shipley, supra note 39, at 99. 
60 See id. at 99-130. 
61 See James Gibson, Re-ReifYing Data, 80NOTRE DAME L. REv. 163, 181 (2004). 
62 See Shipley, supra note 39, at 130 ("[A] comprehensive compilation that includes all the 
facts, data, or information from a defined class will rarely exhibit sufficient creativity in 
selection."). 
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interfaces)63 as well as idea or functional features (for example, the 
working algorithms that drive the program's behavior). Underlying 
both of these outwardly visible features is the code itself, the computer 
language that instantiates both the expressive and functional aspects that 
are apparent to a user of the program. Computer code itself has been 
found to include both idea and expression components as welJ.64 Thus, 
the answer to the question of whether software is a copyrightable 
expression or a non-copyrightable (and potentially patentable )65 
functional idea is that it is both.66 It is determining the placement of this 
line between functional ideas and creative expression that creates 
difficulty in obtaining copyright protection for software, as explained in 
the Altai case. 
In the Altai case, the Second Circuit attempted to solve this 
difficulty and determine what portion of software is covered by 
copyright protection; the result of this attempt is the widely adopted, yet 
difficult to apply, "abstraction-filtration-comparison" test.67 The 
dispute between Computer Associates and Altai arose because both 
companies had offered software that organized and efficiently scheduled 
a set of tasks for a computer. 68 The Computer Associates program was 
adapted to run on multiple IBM operating systems, while Altai's 
program ran on only one operating system.69 Computer Associate's 
program was more successful; Altai's customers were predictably 
displeased. 70 In an attempt to compete, Altai hired a former employee 
of Computer Associates, who proceeded to copy a significant portion of 
Computer Associate's adapter code and incorporate it into Altai's 
scheduling program.7 1 Computer Associates filed suit against Altai, 
claiming both misappropriation of trade secrets and copyright 
infringement of the adapter computer code.72 
Both the district court and the Second Circuit struggled to apply 
traditional copyright law to computer programs. The district court 
recognized computer software has two aspects-a static structure, 
63 Courts have, however, denied copyright protection for some user interfaces of software, 
reasoning that the interface functions as a method for operating a computer program. See, e.g., 
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 816 (1st Cir. 1995). 
64 See Pamela Samuelson, et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer 
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308, 2310 ( 1994). 
65 Patent protection for the functional aspects of software, however, is in a state of flux and 
coverage is uncertain. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
66 See Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 381, 414 (2005). 
67 See, e.g., Lateef Mtima, So Dark the CON(TU) of Man: The Quest for a Software 
Derivative Work Right in Section 117, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 23, 95 n.226 (2007). 
68 Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d at 698-99 (2d Cir. 1992). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Jd. at 700. 
72 Jd. 
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which is the text of the code and the arrangement of the instructions, 
and a dynamic structure, which is the way the program runs and reacts 
to user inputs. 73 Because the court determined that the dynamic 
component is simply a process or idea and thus cannot be protected by 
copyright law, the court analyzed only the static, source code, portion of 
the software at issue, and found no infringement. 74 On appeal, the 
Second Circuit did not limit its review to only the static portion of the 
software, but held instead that some non-literal structures of computer 
programs may be protected by copyright to prevent the clever infringer 
from merely rewriting the code to avoid liability; 75 the difficulty is in 
deciding which elements are eligible for protection, leading the court to 
develop the abstraction-filtration-comparison test. In applying the test, 
a court is to first "dissect the allegedly copied program's structure and 
isolate each level of abstraction contained within it."76 Next, the court 
determines whether the inclusion of each level of abstraction "was 
'idea' or dictated by considerations of efficiency, so as to be necessarily 
incidental to that idea; required by factors external to the program itself; 
or taken from the public domain."77 The components required by idea 
or efficiency are not eligible for copyright protection; the remaining, 
expressive portions are protectable and, at the last step of the Altai test, 
are compared with the corresponding portion of the allegedly infringing 
product to determine infringement. 78 
The first step, isolating levels of abstraction, represented an 
important acknowledgement that software exists on many levels and 
that the idea/expression dichotomy may be relevant at each of these 
levels.79 However, the second step of filtering out idea and expression 
at each level is much more difficult to apply and has been quite 
controversial. 80 In any case, it is clear that copyright protection does not 
extend to many of the more important, functional aspects of computer 
programs. Thus, as with databases, the more useful portions or 
embodiments of software lie beyond the protection of copyright law. 
Even if an information product, such as a database or software 
program, were found to meet both the requirements of originality and 
73 Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 559-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) 
[hereinafter Altai 1]. 
74 /d. at 560. 
75 Altai, 982 F.2d at 706. 
76 !d. at 707. 
77 !d. 
78 !d. at 710. 
79 See, e.g., Andrew G. Isztwan, Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc.: Protecting 
the Strncture of Computer Software in the Second Circuit, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 423, 448-49 
(1993). 
80 See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and 
Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 112 (1993); Mark D. Perdue & Robert A. Felsman, Recent 
Developments in Copyright Law, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 459, 469 (1996). 
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expressiveness discussed above, there is a third doctrine in copyright 
law-fair use-that could easily decimate any protection obtained. Fair 
use is a defense to copyright infringement that essentially allows, in 
certain circumstances, unauthorized use by someone other than the 
copyright owner.8 1 Although it began as a judicially created doctrine, 
fair use has been codified and applies to all copyrighted works.82 The 
fair use analysis is based on four non-determinative factors: 1) the 
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; 3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 4) the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.83 The second factor, the nature of the work, nearly 
always weighs against the creators of databases and computer programs 
because these works already reside at the margin of copyright coverage 
due to their information content. 84 Because of this particular 
applicability to databases and software, fair use likely eviscerates any 
protection that might otherwise be available. 
II. WHY ALTERNATIVE LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL MECHANISMS Do NOT 
WORK 
In the absence of traditional intellectual property protection under 
either patent law or copyright law, creators of information products 
have sought various alternative legal and non-legal mechanisms to 
provide some manner of exclusivity in which to reap a benefit from 
their development investments. Legal theories advanced include quasi-
intellectual property doctrines, such as liability under trade secret and 
misappropriation, as well as non-intellectual property claims in contract 
and trespass, among others. Non-legal options have included using 
technological or operational mechanisms that provide some measure of 
exclusivity, or at least some sort of artificial lead-time, to the creator of 
81 See Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of 
Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 516,524 (1981) (defining fair use as a "privilege 
in others than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner 
without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright." 
(citation omitted)). 
82 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (D. Mass. 1841). 
83 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
560-69 (1985) (explaining the fair use factors). 
84 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563 (explaining that information products are favored as 
subjects of the fair use defense and that the importance of disseminating factual works to the 
public also weighs in favor of fair use). It should be noted, however, that the second factor has 
little significant effect on the fair use inquiry. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. 
Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549,586 (2008). 
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the information product. As appealing as these options may seem, they 
each have one or more significant flaws-most yield incomplete 
coverage, some are unlikely to withstand judicial scrutiny, some are 
difficult to apply on a large scale, and all fail to provide the oversight 
and safety valves that are essential in traditional intellectual property 
regimes. As a result, resort to these mechanisms leads to both 
overprotection and under-protection of information products. 
A. Trade Secret Protection 
Trade secret protection IS often considered an auxiliary to the 
traditional intellectual property regimes and so would seem to be a 
natural next choice for an information product's creator seeking to 
protect his investment. Trade secret protection, a state law mechanism, 
generally covers valuable or commercial information to the extent that 
information is kept secret. 85 However, many information products 
derive some or all of their value from the fact that the information can 
be used publicly, and thus these works are not eligible for trade secret 
protection.86 Also, because trade secret protection arises from state law, 
there may be variations from state to state that make enforcement more 
costly or difficult.87 Finally, as a matter of policy, trade secret law is 
typically disfavored because it actually inhibits, rather than promotes, 
the flow of information via the disclosure or dissemination encouraged 
by the traditional intellectual property regimes. 88 As such, even if trade 
secret coverage is available for information products and the differences 
in the laws across the various states are insignificant, trade secret 
85 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-02 (1984) (defining a trade 
secret as "information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to 
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it ... the extent of the property 
right therein is defined by the extent to which the owner of the secret protects his interest from 
disclosure to others" (citation omitted)); Constance E. Bagley & Gavin Clarkson, Adverse 
Possession for Intellectual Property: Adapting an Ancient Concept to Resolve Conflicts Between 
Antitrust and Intellectual Property Laws in the Information Age, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 327,332 
(2003). Know-how protection, a contractual agreement to share information, is similar in that it 
too relies on the secrecy value of the information and is governed by state law. See, e.g., J.H. 
Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
2432, 2438-39 (1994). 
86 An alternative way to look at this is that trade secret protection is available if the creator of 
the information product forgoes the value corresponding to the public use of the information and 
keeps the work secret instead. This is analogous to the database creator devaluing his information 
product by being less than exhaustive in his content or less than logical in his arrangement. See 
supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
87 Many states (specifically, 42 states and the District of Columbia by 1999) however, have 
based their trade secret laws around the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, so the variations may be 
insignificant. See Bagley & Clarkson, supra note 85, at 332. 
88 See, e.g., Chris J. Katopis, Patients v. Patents?: Policy Implications of Recent Patent 
Legislation, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 329,377 (1997). 
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protection is inappropriate because it lacks the safety valve of 
disclosure. 
B. Misappropriation 
The misappropriation doctrine, which prohibits the unauthorized 
taking of another's works, has also been used as a mechanism for 
protecting products where other intellectual property regimes do not 
seem to apply,89 as is the case with many information products. It was 
in precisely this circumstance that the Supreme Court gave life to the 
doctrine in International News Service v. The Associated Press case.9° 
International News Service (INS) obtained over wire service many news 
stories that had been gathered and prepared by the Associated Press 
(AP).91 Before AP could publish the stories itself, INS published the 
same stories in its own publications.n The news stories prepared by AP 
were not eligible for copyright protection because the works failed to 
meet the originality and expression requirements.93 Further, the news 
stories were not subject to trade secret protection because the stories had 
not been kept secret.94 Yet, the Court upheld an injunction against INS, 
prohibiting it from using AP's news bulletins in this way.95 The Court 
based the liability of INS on misappropriation.96 This expanded liability 
for misappropriation, however, was limited to "hot news" and may have 
signaled the Court's discomfort with the resuJt.97 More recent cases 
applying the misappropriation doctrine have reinforced and heightened 
the "hot news" limitation.98 Although the "hot news" requirement 
serves as a safety valve to limit the scope of misappropriation coverage, 
it also limits the ability of the doctrine to provide adequate protection 
for the majority of information products, which often include 
information beyond merely "hot news." 
89 See Charles Brill, Legal Protection of Collections of Facts, 1998 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 
I, 20 (1998). 
90 284 U.S. 215 (1918). 
91 !d. at 231. 
92 !d. 
93 In particular, the Court would not credit AP with ownership of the news simply because 
AP happened to report it, nor could AP claim copyright infringement because INS was not simply 
taking AP's expression, but rather using the unprotectable facts. !d. at 234-37. 
94 !d. at 235. 
95 !d. at 245-46. 
96 !d. 
97 See Zimmerman, supra note 8, at 721. 
98 See, e.g., Nat' I Basketball Ass'n. v. Motorola Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (1997)(applying an INS v. 
AP analysis and requiring a quite narrow "hot news" component to avoid preemption by 
copyright laws). 
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C. Contract 
Because traditional intellectual property regimes, as well as 
schemes like trade secret and misappropriation that have developed at 
the margins of intellectual property, fail to provide sufficient protection 
for information products, creators of these works often tum to other 
legal means, like contract, to limit the use (or misuse) of the products. 
Databases and software in particular have often found protection via 
contract and have been subject to both negotiated and shrink-wrap 
licenses.99 Where a negotiated contract involves the usual agreement 
between the two participating parties, shrinkwrap licenses typically go 
into force when the customer opens the packaging that encloses the 
product, even though the customer may not actually get to review the 
terms of the license until after it has already been entered and the 
customer certainly did not take part in negotiating the terms.Ioo 
Although the validity of shrinkwrap licenses has been questioned, they 
have uniformly been found valid and enforceable. 101 
One well-known case where a shrinkwrap license was held valid 
and enforceable against a user of an information product is the ProCD 
v. Zeidenberg case. 102 In ProCD, the information product was a single 
electronic database consisting of the combination of digitized phone 
books from across the United States.103 This type of database, because 
of its lack of originality in selection or arrangement, was not eligible for 
copyright protection after Feist; ProCD, the database creator, instead 
used contracts to license use of the product and to limit the use of the 
data included in the database by specifically prohibiting the reposting of 
the contents of the database on the Intemet. 104 In determining whether 
Zeidenberg had breached the contract, the district court held that the 
shrinkwrap license was preempted by the Copyright Act and not 
enforceable. 105 ProCD appealed this issue to the Seventh Circuit, which 
held that enforcement of shrinkwrap licenses where the contract terms 
are not contrary to regular contract rules does not run afoul of the 
Copyright Act, is not preempted, and can be a valid mechanism for 
protecting information products.I06 
99 See Brill, supra note 89, at 24. 
100 See Jacqueline D. Lipton, IP's Problem Child: Shifting the Paradigms for Software 
Protection, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 205, 221 n.96 (2006). See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual 
Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995). 
101 See Lemley, supra note 100, at 221 n.96. 
102 86 F.3d 1447 (7thCir. 1996). 
103 !d. at 1449. 
104 !d. at 1450. 
105 !d. at 1453. 
106 !d. at 1454-55. 
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Contract law certainly provides an appealing alternative to 
traditional intellectual property protection. Like intellectual property 
regimes, contracts carry the force of law. Businesses are comfortable 
and familiar with contracts, probably even more so than intellectual 
property. Further, after ProCD, contracts can be written to restrict 
virtually any legal behavior. And above all, shrinkwrap licenses, which 
are common in the information product industry, permit a one-sided 
determination by the creator of what types of access and use are 
permissible. 
Despite this allure, however, there are disadvantages to using 
contract law to protect information products. The first disadvantage is 
that effective use of contract law may be difficult in practice for a 
number of reasons. While contractual protection may be useful for 
information products used by a small number of consumers, it may 
become unwieldy to actually police and enforce as the number of users 
grows. 107 Also, because of the easily transferable nature of information 
products, the enforceability of the contractual provisions may be 
compromised because contract terms can only be enforced against 
parties in privity; once the information product is released to a non-
associated third party, there is no recourse against that third party who 
was not privy to the contract. 108 Further, because contract law is a state 
law creation, it is not uniform domestically, and contracts are difficult, 
if not impossible, to enforce globally. 109 The second disadvantage is 
that contract law provides little or no oversight or safety valves and thus 
allows protection of information beyond the scope that may be deemed 
acceptable by the public. Because of the importance of freely flowing 
information, a protection scheme such as contract that permits the 
creator great latitude in keeping information from being used is not an 
acceptable protection scheme. 
D. Trespass to Chattels 
Although trade secret, misappropriation, and contract law have 
been the primary non-intellectual property legal sources used to protect 
information products, some courts have taken far more creative 
approaches to craft what they consider a fair resolution in cases of 
misappropriation of information products. One such approach is 
107 See Brill, supra note 89, at 25. 
108 See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454 ("Contracts ... generally affect only their parties."); Brill, 
supra note 89, at 25; Sharon K. Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Name Is Still a Contract: 
Examining the Effectiveness of Trade Secret Clauses to Protect Databases, 45 IDEA 119, 147 
(2005). 
109 See Bitton, supra note 9, at 160. 
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trespass to chattels, notably applied in the eBay v. Bidder's Edge 
case. 11 0 Generally speaking, this tort involves the unauthorized 
interference with or use of another's personal property that results in 
damage. 111 The eBay court stretched this doctrine to apply to a situation 
where a "web crawler" program was systematically obtaining auction 
information from websites. 112 Although the unauthorized interference 
or use was clear, the requisite damage was not; rather, the court based 
its reasoning on the potential damage that would (or could) result after 
the computer system crashed under the aggregate effects of many of 
these web crawler programs. 113 Despite the novelty and creativity of the 
application of this doctrine, there are significant limitations to its 
widespread use. First, the doctrine provides incomplete coverage 
because it is of little use to creators of information products that do not 
reside on servers (such as printed or CD-ROM databases or software 
distributed on disk media) because there can be no damage, even 
considering the low threshold level of "potential crashing" that the eBay 
court found. The coverage is also incomplete because the tort will only 
apply to infringing activities that may, in the aggregate, cause server or 
network damage. 114 While web crawling may be resource consuming 
and present a chance of crashing a server in the presence of multiple 
intrusions, a simple single copy may not have that potential for causing 
damage, even if the information product resides on a server. Second, 
this claim has been tested in very few circumstances; it may be unlikely 
to withstand judicial scrutiny were it to be used more frequently. 
Finally, even though the trespass to chattels claim is unlikely to create a 
viable level of protection for most information products, it is disfavored 
because it too lacks any sort of oversight or safety valve: essentially, if 
there is damage to the creator based on access to the information 
product, liability may be found, but there is no effort to protect and 
facilitate the use of information generally. 
E. Other Legal Protection 
In certain limited circumstances, other legal theories may provide 
110 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Incomplete 
Commodification in a Computerized World, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 3 
(Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel, eds. 2002). 
Ill See Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 4 73 (Cal. App. 1996); Bitton, supra 
note 9, at 166. 
112 eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2dat 1069-70. 
113 /d. at 1069-72. 
114 See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 306-07 (Cal. 2003) (finding no trespass to chattels 
where there was no physical harm to the computer system); see also Radin, supra note II 0, at 
403-05; Bitton, supra note 9, at 167. 
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potential protection for information products. For example, criminal 
law may be used to protect many features of electronic databases and 
software, based on computer crime and anti-hacking statutes. 115 Privacy 
and confidentiality laws may provide a level of protection for databases 
that contain certain types of personal data. 116 However, these theories 
are available only in specialized circumstances and do not provide 
broad or certain coverage. Further, none of these theories have the 
built-in safety valves or oversight necessary for appropriate coverage of 
information products. 
F. Partial Legal Coverage 
Although legal protection, either via intellectual property regimes 
or otherwise, is generally incomplete in its coverage of information 
products, it can potentially be used to provide at least partial coverage 
or coverage of certain aspects of the work, especially where these 
aspects are added with the purpose of deterring copying and enhancing 
legal protection. One good example of this is a legal database, such as 
those maintained by LEXIS and Westlaw. 117 The underlying data in 
these databases, namely the opinions of courts, are not protected by 
copyright; however, the database provider adds copyrightable elements, 
in the form of case summaries and head notes, as well as proprietary 
searching means and graphical interfaces. 118 These elements can be, 
and are, protected then by copyright law. Further, LEXIS and Westlaw 
also limit access through contract and licensing provisions. Using 
multiple methods of coverage in conjunction may provide the creator of 
an information product with a more adequate level of protection for his 
work; however, the combination of protection schemes also makes it 
difficult to access and legally copy that data that is within the public 
domain and should be free for use. Therefore, the wider scope of 
protection actually ends up creating a greater inhibition to the free flow 
of information, and this method is not favorable. 
115 See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Marriage of Convenience? A Comment on the Protection of 
Databases, 82 CHL-KENT L. REV. 1171, 1172-73 (2007) (noting that the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2006), which prohibits unauthorized, damaging access to 
computers for the purpose of obtaining information, may be useful against competitors who 
"copy frequently updated information from a 'dynamic' database"); Bitton, supra note 9, at 148. 
116 See Bitton, supra note 9, at 149. 
117 See id. at 136. The LexisNexis database is available at http://www.lexis.com, while the 
Westlaw database is available at http://www.westlaw.com. 
118 See Bitton, supra note 9, at 136. 
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G. Non-Legal Mechanisms 
Despite the wide variety of legal means that have been applied to 
protect information products, the extent of coverage available for these 
works and the ease of obtaining that coverage remains quite uncertain, 
both for practical and doctrinal reasons. Thus, creators of information 
products have also explored non-legal mechanisms, such as 
technological measures and creative business plans, to obtain the 
artificial lead-time or measure of exclusivity required to protect some of 
their investment in the creation of these works. 
1. Technological Mechanisms 
The most common non-legal mechanism for protecting information 
products is the use of technological safeguards to prevent against 
unauthorized access, uses and appropriation of these products. 11 9 
Digital rights management (DRM) tools may be used, for example, to 
limit who may access the work, the duration for which access is 
allowed, and the ability to reproduce or retransmit the work. 120 Anti-
circumvention laws, which prohibit the disabling or hacking of DRM 
tools, provide a layer of legal protection on top of the technological 
layer. 121 For example, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 
makes illegal the circumvention of DRM tools that control access to a 
work if done with the intent to violate any rights under copyright law. 122 
Beyond DRM technology, the way some information products are 
naturally configured provides additional options for technological 
safeguards. For example, many database management systems are set 
up so that access to the entirety (or even a substantial portion) of the 
contained database is difficult, if not impossible. 123 
While not perfect, DRM technology and limited access rights have 
been used with some success to protect investments in information 
products. The most significant disadvantage with DRM technology 
(and taking advantage of the natural configurations of these products) is 
that it can be, and often is, used to limit access to information content 
that should not be so limited and thus inhibit information flow. 124 The 
119 See Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENY. U. L. REV. 13, 
14 (2006). 
120 See Dan L. Burk, DNA Rules: Legal and Conceptual Implications of Biological "Lock-
Out" Systems, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1553, 1563 (2004). 
121 See Yu, supra note 119, at 32. 
122 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
123 See Bitton, supra note 9, at 142. 
124 See Dan L. Burk & Tarleton Gillespie, Autonomy and Morality in DRM and Anti-
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creator can use these means to include and obtain protection over more 
content than he might be able to get under a legal scheme. For example, 
the creator might use DRM to prohibit any copying of a computer disk 
containing an information product, even though a purchaser of a 
computer disk is typically permitted to make a back up copy for 
personal use. While this may encourage the creators of these works by 
providing enhanced protection, this method is not favorable because the 
over-inclusion of content being protected will likely inhibit, not 
facilitate, information flow, especially in the absence of associated 
oversight and safety valves. 
2. Business Schemes 
One of the main justifications for providing a protection scheme 
for information products is to give the creator of the work an artificial 
lead-time to receive some level of compensation for his efforts. As 
discussed above, this is particularly critical for information products, as 
the cost of development is front-end loaded and the end-product is 
easily duplicable and transferable. While legal schemes and 
technological measures provide an artificial lead-time in order for the 
creator to recoup his investment, business schemes have been used to 
give the creator a different sort of advantage over his competitors and a 
means to obtain compensation for the development costs associated 
with the information product. Although it is often necessary to use one 
of these other means in conjunction with the business scheme, the 
below-described options may decrease the amount of artificial lead-time 
or exclusivity that a creator needs to reap the desired reward. Two of 
these potential business schemes are the provision of complementary 
services or bundling of products and differentiated market pricing. 
The provision of auxiliary services or bundling of related products 
is particularly useful in the information products industry. Although the 
information product itself may be unprotectable, the creator uses the 
additional service or product to distinguish himself and develop a 
consumer base that gives him the market advantage necessary to recoup 
the resources invested in creating the information product. In contrast, a 
party that merely appropriates (or misappropriates) the developed 
information product will likely be uninterested in or incapable of 
providing this panel of complementary goods and services, and thus will 
be less attractive to consumers. 125 There are a number of successful 
examples of this business model, particularly in the open source 
Circumvention Law, 4 TRIPLE C 239, 244 (2006), available at http://triplec.uti.at/files/ 
tripleC4(2)/Burk-Gillespie.pdf. 
125 See Bitton, supra note 9, at 127. 
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software industry. 126 One such company is Red Hat, 127 which has been 
built around the model of providing services to accompany Linux, 128 an 
open source software product that specifically cannot be protected by 
typical protection schemes. 129 In the absence of being able to protect 
the software product, Red Hat has developed value and a consumer 
following for its particular accompanying services, which gives it an 
advantage over other companies that can also distribute Linux products. 
Database providers may provide similar valuable services such as 
possession of the infrastructure for service, ongoing enhancement, and 
maintenance. 130 Database providers may also bundle the actual 
database with powerful proprietary search engines or management 
systems. 131 These complementary products and services are not likely 
to be available from a party who merely appropriates the database, and 
such add-ons give the creator of the information product an advantage, 
in the absence of exclusivity, to allow him to benefit over other 
providers. 
Another business scheme that allows an information product 
creator to recoup the resources he invested into the development of the 
work is differentiated pricing, although this system often does require at 
least some level of exclusivity to be successful. 132 However, if 
differentiated pricing can be used, the period of exclusivity required to 
reap an adequate return may be decreased. Differentiated pricing 
involves charging different segments of the consumer market different 
prices, based on each segment's need and ability to pay.m For 
example, if the information product creator: 
is able to segment the market into commercial and academic sectors 
successfully, and if the demand in the academic sector is more price-
sensitive than in the commercial sector, we will obtain the outcome 
which prevails in several disciplines: provision of the good at two 
126 In the open source software industry, participants specifically eschew intellectual property 
protection for their products. Instead, the open source movement is based on a protocol of 
openness and sharing. Yet, even with their works being unprotected, some companies have 
created businesses around these products. See ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE 
BAZAAR (200 I). Although open source creators opt for a lack of protection, the business models 
that have been used in this industry are applicable to the information product arena as well. 
127 See Red Hat, http://www.redhat.com. 
128 See Linux Online, http://www.linux.org. 
129 See RAYMOND, supra note 126, at 137. 
130 See Bitton, supra note 9, at 127. 
131 See Dov S. Greenbaum, The Database Debate: In Support of an Inequitable Solution, 13 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 431, 483-84 (2003). 
132 See Bitton, supra note 9, at 136. 
133 See Bronwyn H. Hall, On Copyright and Patent Protection for Software and Databases: A 
Tale of Two Worlds, in ECONOMICS, LAW & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: SEEKING STRATEGIES 
FOR RESEARCH AND TEACHING IN A DEVELOPING FIELD 259, 270 (Ove Granstrand, ed. 2003). 
Although Hall is focused on software and databases, there is no reason that the reasoning would 
not apply to information products generally, as these works are defined by the characteristic of 
high fixed development costs and low duplication and transfer costs. 
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widely differing prices, often differentiated in a variety of ways to 
ensure that the markets remain segmented."134 
Bronwyn Hall explains this is a matter of simple economic theory: 
[I]f society benefits from researchers having access to some forms of 
information at low cost, and there exists private sector willingness to 
pay for that information, then subsidies to researchers so that they 
can acquire the information would be socially beneficial, and at the 
same time, would leave the incentives to produce the information 
intact." 135 
In the absence of protection, however, price differentiation is not likely 
to succeed; this tool works best in conjunction with one of the other 
legal or technical mechanisms discussed above. 
Neither of these business schemes-provision of accompanying 
goods or services nor price differentiation-solves the problem of 
giving the creators of information products the protection desired while 
still facilitating and encouraging the flow of information. For this 
reason, these means of providing an information product creator with a 
market advantage using business means are not favorable. 
H. International and Proposed Schemes 
The lack of protection for information products is not new, nor is it 
unique to the United States. In the international arena, improved 
protection systems for information products have been implemented, 
although it is unclear whether the schemes have been successful. In this 
country, legislators and academic commentators have offered numerous 
proposals over the years aimed at providing improved protection for 
information products in this country, but none have been implemented. 
In any case, both the international schemes and the proposed systems 
are fairly similar to the legal and alternative means described above, and 
thus suffer from the same shortcomings. 
1. International Protection 
The most visible international protection for any form of 
information product is found in the European Union (EU) Directive on 
the protection of databases (Database Directive ). 136 The Database 
134 !d. 
135 See id. at 273. 
136 Council Directive 96/9 1996 O.J. (L077) 20 (EC). Other countries have examined 
protection for databases as well; these analyses often tum on a review of "originality," like the 
Feist decision in the United States, and so will not be independently reviewed in this paper. For a 
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Directive was developed in "response to perceived needs to harmonize 
protection for databases within the EU and to provide greater protection 
for the investment in the creation and maintenance of databases."137 
The Database Directive sought to achieve this greater protection in two 
ways: harmonizing the standard for granting copyright protection in 
databases and implementing a sui generis protection scheme for 
databases that failed to qualify for copyright protection. 
First, the Database Directive harmonizes copyright protection for 
databases in member countries, basing protection on the original 
selection or arrangement of the data. 13 8 This provision, requiring 
members to grant copyright protection in databases that, "by reason of 
their selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author's 
own intellectual creation,"139 is not unlike the Feist standard in the 
United States. As discussed above with respect to protection for 
information products under copyright law, this provision of the 
Directive fails to adequately protect most useful databases. 140 
Second, the Database Directive creates a sui generis right for the 
protection of databases that do not qualify under the originality 
requirement for copyright protection, so long as a substantial 
investment, either qualitative or quantitative, has been made in 
obtaining, verifying, or presenting the contents of a database. 141 The sui 
generis right lasts for fifteen years, but can be extended (theoretically, 
into perpetuity) if the database is updated and maintained. This right is 
infringed where a qualitatively or quantitatively substantial portion of 
the database is taken, either via extraction or reutilization, without 
authorization. 142 Although the sui generis right facially appears to grant 
detailed treatment of protection available for databases in countries such as Australia, Canada, 
China, and Russia, see Daniel J. Gervais, The Protection of Databases, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 
1109, 1148-57 (2007). 
137 See Mark Davison, Database Protection: The Commodification of Information, in THE 
FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 167, 168 
(Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholz eds., 2006). 
138 See Council Directive, supra note 136, art. 3(1). 
139 !d. 
140 See supra Part LB. 
141 See Council Directive, supra note 136, art. 7(1). 
142 Extraction refers to the transfer of the contents of a database to another medium by any 
means. See Council Directive, supra note 136, art. 7(2)(a). Reutilization refers to making 
available to the public the contents of a database by distribution, renting, or putting online. See 
Council Directive, supra note 136, art. 7(2)(b). 
The sui generis right also permits member states to allow an exception to infringement by 
unauthorized taking of portions of the database in three circumstances: I) where the reproduction 
of a non-electronic database is for private purposes; 2) where the sole purpose is illustration for 
teaching and scientific research, as long as the source is indicated, and only to the extent justified; 
and 3) where the use is for purposes of public security or for administrative or judicial 
procedures. See Council Directive, supra note 136, art. 9; Lipton, supra note II, at 154-56. 
Although the fair use exception in the United States weighs heavily against creators of 
information products, the exception provided by the Directive is more fairly applicable and does 
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sufficient, but not overreaching, rights to creators of information 
products, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has substantially limited 
the right in practice. In British Horseracing Board v. William Hill 
Organization, the ECJ held that "created" data was not protectable by 
the sui generis right. 143 In the William Hill case, the data in question 
was horse racing information, such as race times and locations, 
maintained in a database by the British Horseracing Board. Although 
Britain's High Court of Justice had determined that the database was 
protected by the sui generis right, based on the resources expended in 
keeping it current, and that William Hill had infringed the right by 
systematically extracting information from the database for profit, the 
ECJ overturned the decision, reasoning that since the British 
Horseracing Board had created the factual data content of the database 
(rather than obtained the data), it was not the type of investment 
required to be eligible for the sui generis right. 144 Because many useful 
information products include both "obtained" data and "created" data, 
the sui generis right does not provide sufficient protection for these 
works. 
Finally, the impact of the Database Directive on the information 
product industry and the future of the Database Directive are unclear. 
In December 2005, a working paper evaluating the Database Directive 
was released, concluding that "[t]he economic impact of the 'sui 
generis' right on database protection is unproven. Introduced to 
stimulate the production of databases in Europe, the new instrument has 
had no proven impact on the production of database."145 However, the 
database industries were also surveyed for the report; these business 
concerns indicated their belief that the sui generis protection was critical 
for their continued success. 146 Although the effect, if any, is unclear 
and there are critics calling for repeal of or at least change to the sui 
generis protection scheme, the EU has not yet changed course and, 
given the perception of the database industry, may never. 
not eviscerate the protection granted as extensively as the fair use provision in the United States. 
143 Case C-203/02 British Horseracing Bd. Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., available at 
http:/leuropa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/copyright/prot-databases/jurisprudence_en.htm. 
144 See id.; see also Mark J. Davison & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Football Fixtures, Horse Races 
and Spin-offs: The ECJ Domesticates the Database Right, 27 EUR. lNTELL. PROP. REV. 113 
(2005). 
145 See Commission of the European Communities, DG Internal Market and Services Working 
Paper: First Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases, at 5 (Dec. 12, 
2005) [Hereinafter, Working Paper], available at 
http:/lec.europa.eulinternal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf; see also 
Davison, supra note 137, at 188, citing Working Paper at 1.4. Davison also offers reports on 
litigation stemming from the Directive. /d. 
146 See Working Paper, supra note 145; Bitton, supra note 9, at 113. 
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2. Proposed Legislation 
In this country, lawmakers have debated some form of protection 
for databases for at least the last decade. 147 In the mid-1990s, the 
United States submitted a database protection treaty proposal to the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WJPO) that was similar in 
scope to the European Union Database Directive. 148 In fact, the 
proposed treaty arguably provided stronger protection to database 
compilers, with a renewable term of 25 years and a DRM provision that 
prohibited circumvention of technology limiting access. 149 WIPO has 
studied database protection, but little has been done because there is 
much opposition, including from the United States.150 
A bill parallel to the WIPO proposal was simultaneously 
introduced in Congress, but was widely opposed and failed to move out 
of the Judiciary Committee. 151 Two years later, database protection was 
once again introduced in Congress, this time drawing from 
misappropriation doctrine; while the initiative passed the floor of the 
House twice, once on its own152 and once as part of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, 153 it never made it to the Senate Floor. The 
drama played out in the same way the very next year. 154 However, the 
failure to enact these proposed bills seems to have less to do with the 
substantive merits of the rights provisions and more to do with politics: 
each of these proposals was met with significant and "well-
orchestrated" opposition by key United States' companies, such as AOL 
and AT&T, and academics. I 55 
Taking a different tactic and with the aim of appeasing the 
147 See Davison, supra note 137, at 174. 
148 See Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention, Proposal of the 
United States of America on Sui Generis Protection of Databases, WlPO Doc. BCPICENIU2-
INRJCENV2 (May 1996); WIPO had also proposed an independent database treaty. See Brill, 
supra note 89, at 41. 
149 See Brill, supra note 89, at 36-40. 
150 See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Political Economies of Harmonization: Database Protection and 
Information Patents 10-51 (Cardozo Law School, Public Research Paper No. 47, July 8, 2002), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=318486. 
151 See Brill, supra note 89, at 41; Database Investment and Intellectual Property Act of 1996, 
H.R. 3531, 104th Congress (1996). 
152 See Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Congress (1998); 144 
Cong. Rec. 9,681 ( 1998). 
153 See 144Cong. Rec. 18,783 (1998). 
154 Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999). This bill 
reached the floor of the full House, but went no further. 
155 See Justin Hughes, Of World Music and Sovereign States, Professors and the Formation of 
Legal Norms, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 155, 186-87 (2003); see also, Yu, supra note I at 4-5 (noting 
that the proposals failed because the biggest database producers at the time were not American 
corporations and that the domestic companies were most concerned about their ability to use 
others' databases if the legislation had passed). 
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domestic business concerns, the 1 08th Congress next took up the issue 
by proposing liability-type protection for databases, hoping to gamer 
more enthusiastic support. 156 Unfortunately, these proposals fared much 
the same as the bills that preceded them and never even reached the full 
House. Very little action has been seen in this area since 2004 and there 
has been no indication that protection for information products will be 
taken up by Congress in the near future. 
3. Commentator Proposals 
Given the disadvantages and failures of existing and proposed legal 
mechanisms to cover information products, it is not surprising that 
commentators have embraced the task of either proposing new solutions 
or, if not providing a solution, at least discussing the factors of a 
successful proposal. 157 Unfortunately, most of the academic proposals 
approach the problem of protection for information products by only 
addressing one type of work; for example, only software or only 
databases. Further, even in their limited scope, the proposals still 
embody many of the disadvantages noted above for the existing 
schemes, and thus none represent a favorable solution for protecting 
information products. 
Some commentators propose implementing protection through 
modifications to existing intellectual property regimes or utilization of 
alternate areas of current law. For example, Michael Steven Green 
argues that by reexamining how we think about copyright, and 
particularly the originality requirement and the idea/expression 
dichotomy, there is room to cover "collective facts" or compiled data. 158 
156 The 108th Congress actually proposed two bills: the Database and Collections of 
Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 108th Cong. (2003), and the Consumer Access to 
Information Act of 2004, H.R. 3872, 108th Cong. (2004). The key feature of House Bill 3261 
was its basis in misappropriation law. Infringement would have consisted of making available in 
commerce a quantitatively substantial portion of the information contained in a database, if" I) 
the database was generated, gathered, or maintained through a substantial expenditure of financial 
resources or time, 2) the unauthorized making available in commerce occurs in a time sensitive 
manner and inflicts injury on the database or [related products or services]," and 3) the ability to 
free ride would lessen the incentive to create the database initially. These elements are not unlike 
the elements created in the INS v. AP case described above-again with the focus on the time-
sensitive nature of the included data. The bill also included significant exceptions, similar to fair 
use. House Bill 3872 was also based on misappropriation and followed a "hot news" type model. 
157 This list is merely exemplary; there are far too many articles on this topic, with new pieces 
being added frequently, to list them all here. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 61; Greenbaum, supra 
note 131; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3; Gervais, supra note 136; Jane C. Ginsburg, 
Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in the United States and 
Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 151 (1997); Amol Pachnanda, Scientific Databases Should Be 
Protected Under a Sui Generis Regime, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 219 (2003). 
158 Michael Steven Green, Copyrighting Facts, 78 IND. L.J. 919,957-63 (2003). 
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Stacey Dogan and Joseph Liu argue that courts can, and indeed have, 
been applying copyright law in a manner that allows protection of 
software information products. 159 Dov Greenbaum suggests an alternate 
structure to aid in protecting databases-the databank.160 A databank 
would be a simple depository of information to be used for scientific 
research and ineligible for protection; a database, by comparison, is a 
highly organized data structure that provides tools for analyzing the data 
and should be eligible for protection under a modified copyright 
protection scheme. 161 Daryl Lim suggests that antitrust law can be used 
to limit access to and use of databases without altering the current 
intellectual property regimes. 162 
Many influential commentators have proposed sui generis 
protection schemes for different sorts of information products. Jane 
Ginsburg, Pamela Samuelson, and Jerome Reichman have all proposed 
a new right of protection for database-type information products. 163 
Pamela Samuelson and Peter Menell have proposed sui generis 
protection for software-type information products.164 Other 
commentators, such as Dan Burk and Charles McManis, have argued 
for sui generis protection for alternative information products like 
genetic sequences and traditional knowledge.I65 
Still other commentators, although avoiding proposing a solution 
to the problem of protection for information products, have provided 
suggestions for shaping a new regime or altering an existing regime to 
cover these works. For example, Jim Gibson argues that any workable 
solution should exploit the technological architecture surrounding 
databases, regulating the extent to which developers can impose 
architectural restraints that limit access, which can further be buttressed 
by "technolegical" measures. 166 Jacqueline Lipton proposes 
159 See Stacey L. Dogan & Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law & Subject Matter Specificity: The 
Case of Computer Software, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203,206 (2005) ("Courts have, on the 
whole, successfully adapted copyright doctrines in a way that respects the underlying copyright 
policies, as applied to the unique aspects of computer software."). 
160 See Greenbaum, supra note 131, at 500. 
161 See id. 
162 See Daryl Lim Tze Wei, Regulating Access to Databases Through Antitrust Law: A 
Missing Perspective in the Database Debate, 2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 7, 8, 30-60 (2006). 
163 See Ginsburg, supra note 157, at 171-76 (proposing sui generis protection for databases); 
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 64-109 (1997) (same). 
164 See PeterS. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 
1329 (1987) (proposing sui generis protection for software); Samuelson et al., supra note 64, at 
2332-2431 (1994) (same). 
165 See Dan L. Burk, Copyrightability of Recombinant DNA Sequences, 29 JUR1METRICS J. 469 
(1989) (proposing a copyright-like protection scheme for biotechnology inventions); Charles R. 
McManis, Thinking Globally, Acting Locally, II CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 547, 563 (2003) 
(discussing sui generis protection for traditional knowledge); see also S. Benjamin Pleune, 
Trouble with the Guidelines: On Urging the PTO to Properly Evolve with Novel Technologies, 
2001 J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 365 (200 I) (proposing DNA-specific sui generis legislation). 
166 See Gibson, supra note 61, at 189-90. 
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reconceptualizing the protection of information products as a system of 
property rights and responsibilities. 167 Her system envisions balancing 
the competing interests of information products creators and the public 
through the imposition of significant legal duties on information 
property rights holders, including obligations such as facilitating 
scientific, technical, or educational use of the information; ensuring the 
accuracy and accessibility of personal information; and protecting 
cultural rights. 168 
As discussed above, current means available for protecting 
information products either result in under-protection, depriving the 
creator of the work the opportunity to recoup the resources invested in 
the development of the product, or over-protection, keeping information 
that would otherwise be available to the public from being accessed or 
used. In the very worst cases, both under-protection and over-
protection may occur. For example, in the case of a database consisting 
mostly of facts that the creator has attempted to cover by contract law, 
his level of protection may be insufficient if a third-party obtains a copy 
of the database because of privity issues in contract. Yet, through the 
use of this very same contract, the creator may limit access to and use of 
mere facts that would otherwise be unprotectable. While the numerous 
articles and proposals for new or improved protection for information 
products clearly demonstrates the need, none address the dual concern 
of providing adequate protection while maintaining a free flow of 
information. 
Ill. PROTECTING AND FACILITATING TRANSACTIONS IN INFORMATION 
PRODUCTS 
Despite the best intentions to keep information "free" by denying 
protection under traditional intellectual property regimes, the reality is 
that an improved protection scheme is necessary to truly facilitate 
information flow. I propose a sui generis protection scheme for 
information products that defines clear rights and boundaries, aimed at 
clarifying the rights of the creator of the work while also facilitating 
transactions in the information, both with an eye towards encouraging 
the free flow of information. My proposal focuses on the overall work 
(both the information and structural components) and, unlike many 
academic and legislative proposals, is applicable to multiple types of 
information products. Many of the objections to the protection of 
information are based on the idea that we do not want "information" 
167 See Lipton, supra note II, at 165. 
168 See id. at 172-73. 
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itself to be protected; that is, we are against the protection of the 
information as the "thing." This is the essence of propertization or 
commodification of information. My proposal instead seeks to provide 
the protection necessary to encourage the development of information 
products while being conscious of the concerns that are raised when 
information is propertized. The main tenet of my proposal is that 
information should be protected not as the "thing," but rather as a 
component of the "thing." Thus, the "thing" being protected is the 
information product as a whole, which consists of both a structural 
component and an information component. In doing so, I aim to 
provide a better definition of precisely when information qua 
information products will be protected. I also center this proposal 
largely on a liability-type regime, which, along with the clarified 
boundaries of protection, should encourage transactions in information 
and information products and, at bottom, the flow of information. 
In this Part, I will explain the essential features of how my 
proposed system of protection works. Next, I will explore the hallmarks 
of any viable protection scheme and explain why my system fits within 
this rubric. Finally, I will explain how my system is different from the 
previously discussed available protection schemes and proposals and 
how my system avoids the pitfalls in which those schemes and 
proposals squarely fall. 
A. Proposed System of Protection for Information Products 
In order to provide improved protection for information products 
while still facilitating the free flow of information, I propose a system 
that better defines the scope of coverage for a wide range of information 
products and incorporates liability-type rules; these two 
improvements-clarifying the boundaries of protection and altering the 
remedies available-should, when taken together, ease the concerns 
about enclosure and even facilitate the flow of information. The 
coverage is tailored to protect not simply data, which offends the notion 
that information should be free; rather the system covers only data that 
has enhanced value based on the added structural component. 
1. Components 
The information products contemplated to be covered by this 
proposal are those that include both an information component and a 
structural component. A component is commonly defined as "a 
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constituent part."169 In the technical arts, such as software, 
componentization is defined as breaking a system into interchangeable 
parts, each of which encapsulate a portion of functionality. 170 Applying 
this idea of componentization to information products, consider a work 
where the information component can be interchanged and where the 
structural component organizes the information component, gives the 
information component context and meaning, and facilitates distribution 
of the information component. A simple example of this idea is a 
database of telephone listings. One information component may consist 
of telephone listings from Richmond, Virginia, housed within a 
structural component of a database that has fields for full name, address, 
and phone numbers. I can easily interchange the above information 
component of listings from Richmond with those from, for example, 
Marion, Illinois. The same structural component still provides the 
context, but the information component that provides the real functional 
data is interchangeable. However, it is possible too to conceive of a 
different structural component, perhaps with fields for only last names 
and phone numbers, in which the same information components may be 
used. The components of the information component are 
interchangeable in this respect as well. This notion of components and 
interchangeability can be extrapolated to cover every type of 
information product for which this system may be used. 
Although the composition of information components may vary 
across the spectrum of information products, there is some information 
that would not fit within this scheme. Simple information about a 
tangible (or even intangible) item or information resulting from a 
process would be unlikely to fall into the category of information 
product to be protected under this scheme. For example, the census 
population of Richmond would not be an information component. 
However, information that would not, by itself, constitute an 
information component can, in relation to other pieces of information 
and within a viable structural component, become an information 
component. 171 If I were instead to create an information component 
comprising all of the cities and towns in Virginia, along with their 
census populations, and put it in a structural component with relevant 
fields, the census population of Richmond might then become one 
portion or entry of the information component. This introduces the 
further notion of the information component as combinable-that is, the 
169 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437,449 n.ll (2007) (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 466 ( 1981 )). 
I70 See, e.g., DEFINE MEANING OF COMPONENTIZA TION, http://looselycoupled.com/glossary/ 
componentization (last visited Mar. I 0, 2008). 
I71 This idea is not dissimilar from Michael Steven Green's idea of protection for "collective 
facts." See Green, supra note 158. However, I do not believe, as Green does, that copyright law 
is the best avenue for covering collective facts, and thus propose a sui generis system. 
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information should be able to be combined with other information or 
components.m It is not simply because it is a bare fact that the census 
population of Richmond is not an information component; on its own, it 
is also not combinable with other components. Even information that is 
quite detailed (unlike a census number) can fall outside the notion of an 
information component. For example, instructions for building a device 
would not likely be an information component, because even though 
detailed, it could not be combined with other components nor could it 
be interchangeable with other components.m 
Many types of information products may include both an 
information component and a structural component and thus will be 
eligible for coverage under the proposed scheme. Two information 
products for which the system has immediately recognizable 
applicability are databases and software; however, the system is also 
potentially applicable to the protection of other existing information 
products. 
a. Databases 
Databases are the most natural type of information products to 
envision in the proposed protection scheme. Originally a military term, 
databases were defined as "collections of data shared by end-users of 
[a] ... computer system."174 Now the term has been expanded to refer 
to any compilation of data that is typically organized and utilized via a 
database management system, providing a bridge between the data and 
the end user. 175 The information component of the database, literally 
the data, is organized by the structural component, the fields of the 
database, which also give context and meaning to the information 
component. The structural component further facilitates distribution of 
the data, or information component, in a useful fashion. 
b. Software 
Software IS slightly more difficult to envision as an information 
172 See Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. at 740 (discussing the difference between simple 
information, such as a blueprint, and information which can be combined with other components, 
such as software). 
173 See id. 
174 See Greenbaum, supra note 131, at 441 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
175 See id. Although most databases today are electronic, printed databases could also be 
covered by this proposal. "[A] database is [simply] an organized and indexed collection of 
information that allows users to access and organize heterogeneous data in an efficient fashion." 
!d. 
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product, in part because software is difficult to define or classify .176 
One definition of software is "a set of instructions: not mere knowledge, 
but a certain arrangement of matter that makes a computer perform." 177 
Working from this definition, the information component of software is 
the set of instructions. The structural component is then the particular 
arrangement of those instructions that organizes the instructions, 
provides context and meaning to the instructions as the organization or 
arrangement is the basis for the instructions to cause the computer to 
behave in a certain fashion, 178 and facilitates the distribution of the 
instructions or information component. 
c. Additional Information Products 
While databases and software provide the simplest examples of 
information products that would be eligible for protection under this 
proposal, there are other works that both have an information 
component and a structural component. Some examples include genetic 
sequence inventions, geo-spatial data, real estate appraisal systems, and 
certain types of indigenous knowledge. Many of these works have been 
likened to specialized forms of databases, where the information 
component is given value by virtue of the organization provided by the 
structural component. 179 These products can be characterized in this 
176 One of the difficulties in classifYing software as an information product may be that, unlike 
databases, software can be and has been viewed in multiple ways. Although not a perfect 
analogy, the Supreme Court recently observed: 
Software, the 'set of instructions, known as code, that directs a computer to perform 
specified functions or operations,' can be conceptualized in (at least) two ways. One 
can speak of software in the abstract: the instructions themselves detached from any 
medium. (An analogy: The notes of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony.) One can 
alternatively envision a tangible 'copy' of software, the instructions encoded on a 
medium such as a CD-ROM. (Sheet music for Beethoven's Ninth.) 
Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. at 447 (quoting Fantasy Sports Props., Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc., 287 
F.3d 1108, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
177 See Margaret Jane Radin, Information Tangibility, in ECONOMICS, LAW & INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: SEEKING STRATEGIES FOR RESEARCH AND TEACHING IN A DEVELOPING FIELD 395, 
402-03 (2003). 
178 See Pamela Samuelson et a!., supra note 64, at 2316. 
179 See, e.g., Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 135 ("Conceivably, ... genetically 
engineered life forms could also fall within the broad definition of database in that they are 
'assemblies ... of ... materials arranged in a methodical or systematic way."'); Eisenberg, supra 
note 10 (likening genetic sequence inventions to scientific information, rather than chemical 
entities); Katleen Janssen & Jos Dumortier, The Protection of Maps and Spatial Databases in 
Europe and the United States by Copyright and the Sui Generis Right, 24 1. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 195 (2006); Bradford S. Simon, Intellectual Property and Traditional 
Knowledge: A Psychological Approach to Conflicting Claims of Creativity in International Law, 
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1613 (2005); Posting of Eric Goldman to Concurring Opinions, 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007 /0 1/real_estate_app.htrnl (Jan. 8, 2007, 23:59 
EST). 
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manner, and so long as they have identifiable information and structural 
components as defined above, they too would fall within the proposed 
scheme. 
2. How Does the Proposed Scheme Work? 
The two most important aspects of the proposed scheme are that a 
creator's rights in the information product are clearly defined and that 
the system is based largely on liability, rather than property type 
rules. 18° First, clearly defined rights are important to encourage creators 
of information products to make the necessary investment in developing 
their product, but also to facilitate transactions in information and 
information products. As economists note, the purpose of a property 
regime is to "ensure that resources are allocated to their highest valued 
use" in order to increase monetary reward and, to achieve this goal, the 
system must clearly define property rights. 181 The clearly defined rights 
then facilitate for private bargaining, 182 permitting parties to effectively 
negotiate for use of and access to the information product on the basis 
of perceived value. As the law currently stands, it is unclear what 
rights, if any, a creator has in any given information product, which 
makes bargaining impossible and thereby inhibits transactions in 
information products and the underlying information. 
Second, a key feature of the proposed system is that much 
infringing behavior is viewed from a liability-type perspective. It may 
seem counterintuitive, after advocating above for clearly defined 
property rights, to propose that a system that relies, at least in part, on 
liability rules. However, that rights are available for information 
products has been clarified by this system. Also, there are regularly 
substitutions of fuzzy, ambiguous rules for clear entitlements, even in 
property-type systems. 183 In fact, at least one commentator has argued 
that "muddy rules" will encourage bargaining where transaction costs 
are high, for example on the Internet. 184 The proposed system defines 
180 The difference between "property rules" and "liability rules" was elucidated by Guido 
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed in their seminal work on this topic, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). Under a 
property rule, the owner has the right to exclude others; under a liability rule, the owner has no 
right to exclude but can demand compensation or damages. See id. at II 05-06. 
181 Christine D. Galbraith, A Panoptic Approach to Information Policy: Utilizing a More 
Balanced Theory of Property in Order to Ensure the Existence of a Prodigious Public Domain, 
15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. I, 33 (2007) (citation omitted). 
182 See id.; Siebrasse, supra note 13, at 56-57. 
183 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 578 
(1988). 
184 See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 121, 138 ( 1999). 
Other commentators have also noted that property rules may be more efficient where borders are 
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the outer extents of protection available, but leaves the details to a 
"muddy," liability-type analysis in order to facilitate transactions and 
allow for the flexibility required to avoid concerns about propertizing 
information. Iss 
One way to view the liability-type regime is to consider that 
potentially infringing behavior resides on a spectrum. In property law, 
the inquiry is typically binary: Is there trespass or not? 186 Instead, for 
the protection of information products, the real analysis should question 
how bad the offending behavior was. At one end of the spectrum, there 
is no protection for the information component separate from the 
structural component. This means that there is no liability for simply 
possessing the information. There is also no liability where the 
information component has been reverse engineered or independently 
created. At the other end of the spectrum, there is full coverage for 
infringement via unauthorized access or appropriation of the entire 
information product, consisting of both the information component and 
the structural component. Because the information product as a whole 
has been taken, this is better treated under a property-type regime and 
the system contemplates injunction as a potential remedy for this. 
The more difficult inquiry occurs when something less than the 
whole is taken, and this is where the liability-type rules will be used. 
For a concrete example, consider a database that includes the names of 
all of the law professors that teach at law schools in the United States, 
their contact information, and their areas of teaching and research. 187 
This database would most likely fail to be protected under copyright 
law, because its selection of data is not unique (all law professors are 
included) and because its arrangement is obvious (for example, by law 
fuzzy. See Richard Epstein, Transaction Costs and Property Rights: Or, Do Good Fences Make 
Good Neighbors? 6-7 (Chicago Working Papers in Law & Economics, 2d Series) (March 1996). 
185 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 180 (suggesting that liability rules may be preferable 
where transaction costs are high, such that a party who places high value on the work can simply 
take it and compensate the owner for the loss); Burk, supra note 184, at 140 ("More often, the 
uncertainty created by the muddy standard tends to channel buyers and sellers into less costly 
informal structures."). This idea is controversial and has won both supporters and detractors. 
Compare Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to 
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995) with Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do 
Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995); 
and Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic 
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996). 
186 To be sure, there is some "muddiness" even in this simple inquiry. Dan Burk explains this 
using the common idea of tying a boat up to a dock. Normally, permission from the dock owner 
is required and the dock owner is free to exclude others from tying up their boats. However, in 
the case of a deadly storm or other exigent circumstances, a sailor may tie up to a dock without 
permission and will simply be liable for any damages incurred, thus turning the simple question 
of trespass into a liability inquiry. See Burk, supra note 184, at 127-28. 
187 Such a database is maintained by the American Association of Law Schools (AALS) and is 
generally protected via contract law. See AALS Directory of Law Teachers DLT, 
http://www.aals.org/services_directory.php (last visited Mar. 2, 2009). 
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school or by subject matter taught). Under the proposed protection 
scheme, however, this database would fare better. Because the 
information component is not independently protectable and reverse-
engineering is permitted, I can-should I wish-go to every law 
school's website and gather up this information on my own, without 
incurring any liability for possessing or using the information thereafter. 
On the flipside, I can not copy wholesale the database (either in print or 
electronic form), as this would be taking the whole information product, 
both the information component and the structural component. In that 
case, I would be subject to traditional property remedies, including an 
injunction if appropriate. 
What is the result, however, if I merely take a portion of the 
database-if I copy only the information component related to 
intellectual property professors in the structural framework? Or if I 
only take a portion of the structural framework, such as only some of 
the fields, and all of the information contained therein-for example, if 
I take only the names and e-mail addresses of all of the professors in the 
database? What if I am merely using the database to verify a single 
fact? 188 These situations are where a liability-type regime provides the 
appropriate response. Where portions of the information component 
and framework have been taken, the remedy will not be an injunction, 
but rather a system of damages to compensate the creator of the 
information product. As with many liability regimes, the amount of 
damages will be determined by looking at a number of factors, such as 
how much of the information product was taken, the reason the 
information product was taken, the relationship between the creator of 
the information product and the party who took the information without 
consent, and the effect of the taking on the market for the original 
information product. 189 The effect of this inquiry will be to permit free 
or cheap access to portions of an information component within one of 
these works subject to the value the information has to the user, permit 
access to the information components in cases of good reason (such as 
educational investigation or research), and permit the creation of new 
inventions (both traditional and information products) so long as the 
effect is not to take away from the market for the original information 
188 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE FOR A STUDY ON PROMOTING ACCESS 
TO SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: 
PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATABASES 34 
(1999) (distinguishing using a database as an end user-to verity a fact or perform a personal 
task-versus using a database for a derivative use, which "builds on a preexisting database and 
includes at least one, and frequently many more, extractions from one or more databases to create 
a new database"). 
I89 In these instances, where portions of an information product are taken, it is important to 
remember that the value of information is not simply related to the quantity of information taken, 
but the value in being able to obtain the necessary information quickly, without having to do the 
searching and gathering. See Gervais, supra note 136, at 1159-60. 
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product. 
The benefits of this scheme are clear. The creator of the 
information product benefits from an artificial lead-time in which to try 
to recover his development investment, but others can effectively make 
a decision about what and whether it is worth for them to use the 
information. Thus, if the information is necessary for innovation in 
another field, it will be available for some cost; if the information 
product is simply being taken to compete with the original information 
product, it will be unavailable or available at an inflated cost. Because 
of the factors that are considered in determining the cost for the 
transactions (liability damages), there is an element of fair use that 
protects innocent and de minimis users, as well as educational and 
research users. The scheme is dynamic, is not tied to any one 
information product, is not tied to any particular technology, and most 
importantly, encourages bargaining outside of the legal system. The 
owner of the information product has the incentive to bargain, because 
only in the face of complete, wholesale infringement is there going to be 
injunctive relief-there is no benefit to acting as a hold-out. Further, 
the user wishing to access and use the information product has an 
incentive to bargain, because the boundaries of the protection covering 
the information product are going to be more clearly defined than those 
that exist today. Most uses of the information component and 
information product are going to result simply in monetary remedies 
and thus a priori negotiations are in all parties' best interests. 
One criticism raised with respect to this proposal is that all 
information is currently available for a cost, so it is unlikely that this 
proposal will result in increased bargaining or negotiation between the 
information product creator and the user desiring access. However, at 
least anecdotally, there is evidence that information product creators do 
not always behave in a rational manner and readily deny access to 
information, even when a reasonable price has been offered. 19o This 
proposal addresses this problem by prohibiting the creator of 
information products to hold-out against an offer; if the creator chooses 
to deny access, a party wanting to use the information product can 
always simply misappropriate the product and pay damages later. 
B. What Makes a Good Protection Scheme and Why This Proposal Is 
One 
In addition to the benefits explained above that largely relate to the 
190 See. e.g., Burk, supra note 184, at 158 ("One might expect serious 'holdout' problems to 
arise in [the informational goods] environment, as every copyright holder attempts to capture the 
full value of every use of his works."). 
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incentives and behaviors of the creators and users of information 
products, there are advantages to this scheme that go beyond simply the 
involved parties. First, the proposal provides more complete and robust 
protection for both existing and future developed information products, 
because the system approaches and protects these works categorically, 
rather than individually. Second, because the proposal is a sui generis 
proposal and is shaped from scratch with the specified goals of 
providing coverage while encouraging information flow, the scheme 
also permits more robust coverage than simply stretching and straining 
existing law to provide an ill-fit quick fix. Third, this proposal uses 
liability-type rules that not only may improve negotiation between 
creators and users, but may generally provide greater flexibility and 
robustness, more access to information, and greater potential for 
information flow for all. 
First, this proposal covers multiple types of information products 
that have received short shrift by existing intellectual property regimes. 
Rather than excluding these works from coverage (either partially or 
completely), this proposal embraces these works, particularly because 
of their information component and the value added by the structural 
component. The system then provides an appropriate level of protection 
that advances both of the stated goals-providing the creator of the 
work with an artificial lead-time to compensate the creator for his 
investment in developing the information product, and facilitating 
transactions in information products by providing a clear and uniform 
boundary of coverage across these works while denying injunctive relief 
that may inhibit information flow. This scheme is attractive in its 
breadth and flexibility to cover a wide range of information products, 
such as databases, software, genetic sequence information, geo-spatial 
data sets, and others, including those not yet developed, rather than 
reacting in a knee-jerk fashion to problems with coverage of one type of 
information product or another, as has been the case previously. The 
robustness of protection for yet developed information products further 
provides an a priori level of coverage that may encourage creation of 
many new types of information products and will facilitate transactions 
because the parties will not need to go through the primary stage of 
determining whether protection is available before negotiations ensue. 
Second, some overarching benefits arise from the fact that the 
scheme is a sui generis proposal, not a mere alteration of existing 
regimes to allow information products to fit. To be sure, sui generis 
systems are not ideal; implementing these systems may cause increased 
transaction and information costs and are further difficult to address on 
the international scale. 19 1 However, as noted above, the existing 
191 See Davison, supra note 137, at 179; Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 912-13. 
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regimes are simply ill-equipped to cover information products, even 
with modifications. If these systems were adapted to cover information 
products, there would likely be too much legislative and judicial 
baggage accompanying the new right and it is unlikely that an actual 
advantage would be realized. 
In an article written by then-Representative Robert Kastenmeier 
and then-House Counsel Michael Remington, the authors explained 
when sui generis protection is appropriate. 192 The test is fourfold, and 
asks 1) whether the new right will fit harmoniously within the existing 
legal framework without violating any basic tenets of law, 2) whether 
the new right can be defined in a reasonably clear manner, 3) whether 
there is a cost-benefit advantage to implementing the new right, and 4) 
whether the new right will "enrich or enhance the aggregate public 
domain."I93 The protection of information products proposed by this 
article meets all four prongs of this test. The proposed protection fits 
harmoniously within existing law, because currently there is little 
protection for information products under intellectual property laws. 
One of the main purposes of this proposal is to clearly define that there 
is a right in information products. The cost-benefit advantage and the 
enrichment of the public domain have been discussed above in 
explaining how the proposal will actually facilitate the flow of 
information beyond what is currently occurring under the various self-
help remedies. 
Sui generis legislation has been used in precisely these situations, 
where there is a new technology that resides on the margins of 
traditional technology and does not fit comfortably within traditional 
intellectual property regimes. The most prominent of the sui generis 
intellectual property-type regimes is the Semiconductor Chip Protection 
Act of 1984 (Chip Act).194 The Chip Act blended elements of patent 
law and copyright law in an effort to more fully cover semiconductor 
advances, while also being cognizant of some of the major concerns 
about protecting innovation, such as protecting the public domain and 
permitting reverse-engineering. 195 The Chip Act also rejects 
compulsory licensing and protects innocent infringers. 196 Similarly, 
other special purpose intellectual property laws have been enacted to 
protect industrial designs and plant varieties, as well as other creations 
that do not fit well within either the patent or copyright regime. 197 One 
constant criticism of sui generis protection is that by the time the new 
192 See Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection 
Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 417 (1985). 
193 See id. at 440-42. 
194 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (2006). 
195 See Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 906-07. 
196 Seeid.at911. 
197 See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 53. 
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rights come to fruition, technology has advanced past the point of being 
protected. 198 However, by addressing information products as a broad 
category with similar features, this proposal seeks to avoid premature 
obsolescence and should cover yet-developed information products with 
no alteration to the system. 
Third, the proposed protection scheme achieves many advantages 
because it is not entirely founded on property rules, but rather a mixture 
of property and liability rules depending on the extent of infringing 
behavior. There are essentially two ways in which information can be 
protected-either under a property rule or under a liability rule. 199 
Generally, as noted above, property rules provide for the creation of 
exclusive rights and the possibility of injunctive relief, while liability 
rules do not create definitive exclusion and instead provide for payment 
of money damages for non-consensual or unauthorized access.200 Mark 
Lemley and Philip Weiser have provided a framework to determine 
which remedial scheme (property or liability) is appropriate based on 
whether injunctive relief against an infringer would over-compensate 
the plaintiff and over-deter the defendants.201 When such over-
compensation and over-deterrence occur, the protection should follow a 
liability scheme.2o2 Clearly this is analogous to the problematic 
situation that arises with most self-help means taken by information 
product creators-the creator is able to appropriate more than he is 
entitled to and, because of this, potential users of the information are 
unnecessarily inhibited. As Lemley and Weiser explain, at the remedial 
stage, over-compensation of the plaintiff and over-deterrence of the 
defendant often arises when a court cannot easily tailor an injunction to 
forbid only the prohibited conduct.203 In the case of information 
products, this difficulty in crafting relief of appropriate scope nearly 
always arises; denominating a clear scope of a property right is virtually 
impossible in the information products arena.204 The proposed system, 
198 See Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-institutional Approach to Patent 
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1128 (2003) ("The Semiconductor Chip Protection 
Act, which sets up a sui generis regime of intellectual property protection for chips, was 
superseded by new technology soon after its creation."); A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for 
Copyright than for Patent Protection of Computer Programs, 72 NEB. L. REV. 351,450-51 (1993) 
(noting that the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act was made obsolete by advances in 
technology even before it was enacted); Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the 
Common Law in Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309, 310-17 (2002) (making the same argument 
with respect to the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act and the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act). 
199 Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern 
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 783-84 (2007). 
200 !d. at 786. 
201 See id. at 784. 
202 See id. 
203 See id. at 785. 
204 See id. at 794. This should not be confused with the clarification that a property right 
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in embracing a largely liability-type regime, avoids this systematic 
overcompensation but still encourages the creation of these works by 
providing more certain protection than is currently offered. 
There are additional benefits of applying a liability regime to the 
protection of information products. One main reason is that information 
simply does not have the attributes that generally characterize property; 
information is a public, not private, good.205 Information is both non-
rivalrous, meaning one can enjoy the good without depleting another's 
ability to also do so, and non-excludable, meaning that once the good is 
made public, the creator can no longer easily control its use.206 If we 
were to award a property right in an information product, we would be 
artificially creating a rivalry and excludability that did not previously 
exist. These artificial limitations drive some of the arguments against 
protecting information products, as information should not be made 
scarce or inaccessible; we want to encourage the flow of information, as 
well as the creation of information products. A liability regime avoids 
these property issues by acknowledging that many can use information 
products without causing depletion. Further, liability regimes allow for 
greater flexibility, and so may be more palatable than property regimes 
when we are concerned with permitting access to information to avoid 
stifling innovation. Finally, regarding feasibility, Congress has already 
approved limited use of liability rules in intellectual property, for 
example, with the use of compulsory licenses in copyright law.207 Thus, 
because liability rules are appropriate for covering information products 
because of their nature, because of the flexibility in application, and 
because of familiarity with this type of remedy, the proposed system 
rests on firm ground. 
Of course, adopting a liability-type regime does not come without 
difficulties. The effectiveness of any liability rule will depend on the 
complexity of that rule, which in tum is going to require an inquiry into 
the extent to which the good is non-rivalrous and enjoyed by many 
without depletion, as well as the ability of a court or regulatory body to 
access information necessary to make determinations.208 The liability 
rules must be clearly defined and appropriately limited so that the 
underlying incentives are not undermined;209 the precise liability rules 
to implement this system are fact dependent and outside the scope of 
this paper. However, so long as the rules implemented minimize 
opportunistic rent-seeking, avoid distorting the marketplace based on 
exists in information products, which is the certainty that is required to encourage transactions in 
information. 
205 See Lipton, supra note 11, at 140-4 L 
206 See Gibson, supra note 61, at 173. 
207 See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 199, at 825. 
208 See id. at 809. 
209 See id. at 813. 
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technological differences, and encourage private bargaining,210 the goals 
of this proposed system should be realized. For these reasons, the 
advantages of this proposed scheme for protecting information products 
should extend far beyond just providing better coverage for information 
product creators and better bargaining between creators and potential 
users of the works. 
C. How the Proposed System Avoids the Pitfalls of Current Schemes 
and Earlier Proposals 
The insufficiencies of the earlier proposed schemes to address 
protection of information products, as well as the currently used 
alternative legal and non-legal mechanisms, can likely be attributed to a 
few related notions that this proposal seeks to avoid. First, those 
schemes are primarily based on property notions, which may not be the 
best fit for information products. Second, those schemes were not 
designed with the aim of facilitating transactions in information, which 
must be a key constituent of any scheme that runs the risk of 
propertizing information. Third, none of these schemes recognize the 
commonalities inherent in the variety of potential information products 
that would make a uniform scheme a better, more robust option, and 
thus do not avoid a usual concern with sui generis protection. 
First, many of the proposed and implemented protection 
mechanisms developed for information products fail, in part, because 
they are typically centered on a property-based scheme. Because 
information is not tangible, applying traditional property rules often 
results in an uneasy fit. 211 In fact, the problem is not just that 
information products are not properly categorized as property, rather 
"these new information products present difficult conceptual problems 
that render them unamenable to intellectual property protection under 
traditional regimes .... "212 Moving from a property regime to more of 
a liability regime would provide greater flexibility and likely be less 
offensive, and thus represent an improvement over existing and 
proposed protection schemes.213 
210 See id. at 829 (discussing the hallmarks of a good liability rule, based on copyright's 
compulsory license provision). See also Davison, supra note 137, at 181-184, for additional 
features required for effective database protection, and Samuelson, et al., supra note 64, at 2412, 
for essential components of effective software protection. 
211 Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 898. 
212 !d. 
213 To be sure, there have been some liability-type regimes proposed, such as the bills raised 
by the I 08th Congress, see supra note !56 and accompanying text, and a modified liability 
regime offered by Jerome Reichman and Pamela Samuelson for the protection of databases. See 
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 145. However, the vast majority of schemes rely on 
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Second, these schemes are not designed with the goal of 
facilitating transactions in information. Although the importance of 
information flow is of general concern in today's society, one of the 
biggest objections to protecting information products is the perceived 
effect of protection on scientific and educational access to information 
products. These users: 
would arguably fare better either under a simple unfair competition 
law that prohibited gross copying or under a sui generis regime built 
on more refined liability principles than under the regimes based on 
exclusive property rights. A liability model would create no legal 
barriers to entry in its own right, nor need it significantly strengthen 
the sole-source data provider's market power. On the contrary, a 
properly crafted liability regime stimulates competition both through 
lead-time incentives to invest and through an automatic 
license .... 214 
Thus, any protection system that combines these first two 
concerns-that is, any property-based scheme with no thought given to 
facilitating transactions-is doomed to fail. 
Third, none of the above schemes recognize just how similar many 
types of information products are, and importantly, that the areas of 
concern in protecting each are the same. Despite the efforts of 
legislators and commentators to propose amendments to existing 
regimes, these too fail because they are isolated to a particular type of 
information product, do not focus on the aspects associated with the 
facilitation of transactions, and do not address the information 
component, where the work's primary value lies. In developing a 
scheme that is flexible enough to cover the existing information 
products (as well as any future information products that include an 
information component), the resulting system will be more robust and 
Jess reactionary. Further a scheme that is centered on the idea of an 
information component will both ease transactions in information and 
secure the valuable portion of the work. 
Finally, despite all of the advantages, I do acknowledge that there 
are some questions that have not been fully resolved by the analysis in 
this Article. One common concern with sui generis protection 
proposals, particularly those that abut the coverage provided by patent 
and copyright Jaws, is whether these schemes are constitutional. 
Although scholars have come out on both sides of this issue,215 the 
property-type enclosures of information, which is not favorable. 
214 Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at !54. 
215 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 12; Yochai Benkler, The Role of Judicial Review in the 
Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2000); 
Malia Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the 
Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47 ( 1999); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3. 
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debate is beyond the scope of this paper and I rely on Justin Hughes' 
article that concludes that, indeed, protection for information products 
outside of the constitutionally scripted protections are permissible.21 6 In 
particular, Hughes suggests that protection for information products 
(and specifically databases) can pass constitutional muster if the true 
focus is on competitors, if there is fair use co-extensive with copyright 
law, if the problems associated with sole source products are avoided, if 
the rights actually expire, and if liability is limited to civil liability 
(among other provisions).2 17 The proposal provided above meets these 
criteria. 
Another concern is the interaction between the proposed system 
and existing alternative legal and non-legal mechanisms. Based on how 
this same question is treated with respect to current intellectual property 
regimes, there seem to be two approaches. Patent law forbids a patent 
holder from attempting to expand his monopoly beyond that granted by 
the patent under the doctrine of patent misuse.m Copyright, on the 
other hand, appears to permit the copyright owner to extend the scope of 
his rights, as is true when digital rights technology is used in 
conjunction with copyrighted works.m Given the primary concern of 
facilitating information flow, a misuse theory may prove useful in the 
information products protection arena to prohibit the rights holder from 
attempting to expand his rights using these alternative means. 
However, the details of such a misuse provision are also beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
CONCLUSION 
While legislators and commentators debate whether information 
products should be protected, creators of these works are seeking self-
help coverage for the information products under a panoply of 
alternative legal and non-legal mechanisms. This results in the 
simultaneous under-protection of information products, to the detriment 
of the creator, and over-protection of these products, which inhibits 
216 See Hughes, supra note 12; see also Gervais, supra note 136, at 1146 ("[So long as it were 
anchored in the commerce clause], it remains unclear whether a federal misappropriation tort for 
databases would necessarily be wholly unconstitutional."). 
217 See Hughes, supra note 12, at 209-13. 
218 The doctrine of patent misuse was first clearly defined in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger 
Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). The Morton Salt case based its reasoning on the policy behind patent 
law. !d. at 492. The doctrine of patent misuse has been narrowed in recent years and may not 
prove as useful in reining in patent holders. See lllinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 
u.s. 28, 42-43 (2006). 
219 Copyright law has also entertained a misuse theory, although it is not well known and is 
less developed than patent misuse. See, e.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 
976 (4th Cir. 1990). 
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information flow. Yet preserving the free flow of information is 
precisely why intellectual property protection has traditionally not been 
offered for these works. 
This Article proposes a sui generis protection scheme that seeks to 
address these issues of under-protection and over-protection. The 
proposed system clarifies that rights are available in information 
products, which should both provide incentives for increased creation of 
these works and should facilitate transactions in these works (and the 
underlying information). The system, however, is also flexible, relying 
on liability-type remedies for most types of infringement to keep 
information freely flowing. This too should encourage negotiations and 
transactions for these products because injunctive relief will rarely be 
available. Denying protection for information products does not ensure 
that information is free. In fact, the opposite seems to be true; 
information may want to be free, but information products do not. 
